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Yerkovich: Torts - The Obvious Danger Rule - A Qualified Adoption of Seconda

TORTS-The Obvious Danger Rule-A Qualified Adoption of Secondary
Assumption of Risk Analysis. O'Donnellv. City of Casper, 696 P.2d
1278 (Wyo. 1985).
On July 8, 1977, Michael O'Donnell was driving a friend's motorcycle on Mariposa Boulevard in Casper, Wyoming. The City of Casper had
resurfaced Mariposa Boulevard a month earlier. As a result of normal
resurfacing procedures and vehicular traffic, ridges and piles of gravel had
accumulated on the road.
As O'Donnell was proceeding down the boulevard, an automobile
pulled into his path. To avoid hitting the vehicle, O'Donnell veered to the
left. He then veered to the right in order to avoid hitting vehicles parked
on the other side of the street. In making these maneuvers, O'Donnell
rode into the loose gravel remaining from the resurfacing, causing him
to "fishtail."' At that point O'Donnell felt that his two choices were "to
lay the motorcyle down" 2 or to run into a parked car on the opposite side
of the street. Estimating that his speed of travel was five to ten miles
per hour, he chose the latter.' Upon impact with the parked vehicle, O'Don4
nell rolled across its hood and fell to the ground, engulfed in flames.
O'Donnell brought suit against Suzuki Motor Company for breach of
warranty, negligent design, and strict products liability' and against the
City of Casper for negligent maintenance of its streets. The district court
granted summary judgment on behalf of Suzuki Motor Company and the
City of Casper. With respect to Suzuki, the district court based the sum6
It
mary judgment on O'Donnell's failure to prove Suzuki's negligence.
7 Regarding
did not specifically address the strict products liability claim.
the City of Casper, the district court applied the obvious danger rule and
of Casper
held that since the danger was obvious to O'Donnell, the City
8
existence.
its
of
warn
or
had no duty to remove the danger
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district
court's findings with respect to the City of Casper." The court held that
the known and obvious danger rule does not negate the City's duty
to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition
and in reasonably good repair, and.., the obvious danger of the
1. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Wyo. 1985).
2. Id. at 1280.
3. Brief for Appellant at 5, O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
4. O'Donnel, 696 P.2d at 1280.
5. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 1; O'Donnel, 696 P.2d at 1280.
6. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3,at 3.
7. O'Donnel, 696 P.2d at 1288.
8. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3,at 3.
9. Since the summary judgment regarding Suzuki in the district court was based upon
the appellant's cause of action for negligent design, the Wyoming Supreme Court refused
to address the issue of strict products liability set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965). O'Donnell 696 P.2d at 1288.
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streets may be considered by the trier of fact to determine the
plaintiff's percentage of negligence. 0
Except in cases regarding landowner liability and natural accumulations
of ice and snow, the Wyoming Supreme Court, with this holding, has overturned the no-duty obvious danger rule. The rule provided that "whenever
the danger is obvious or at least as well known to the plaintiff as it is
to the defendant .... there exists no duty to remove the danger or warn
... of its existence."" In Wyoming a duty now exists to remove obvious
dangers created by a defendant. At the same time the jury may consider
the plaintiff's knowledge of the danger
when apportioning fault between
2
the plaintiff and the defendant.
The O'Donnell decision establishes the Wyoming Supreme Court's
adoption of the implied secondary assumption of risk

3

analysis.14 It is

now clear that Wyoming no longer views a known and obvious danger
as an absolute bar to recovery. The Wyoming Supreme Court found such
an interpretation of the rule incompatible with the doctrine of comparative
negligence, which was adopted by Wyoming in 1973.15 It is clear that
known and obvious dangers may be considered by the trier of fact in apportioning negligence between the plaintiff and the defendant in situations involving man-made dangers. It is unclear, however, how the court
will apply the known and obvious danger rule to situations involving
natural dangers, such as accumulations of snow and ice. A review of the
assumption of risk approach of other comparative negligence jurisdictions,
as well as a review of prior Wyoming decisions, will provide some insight
into how the O'Donnell decision has changed Wyoming law and how it
will influence the law in the future.
BACKGROUND

The relationship between the known and obvious danger rule and the
assumption of risk doctrine is a complicated one. 6 Before considering that
relationship, an understanding of the assumption of risk doctrine is important. The requirements for the affirmative defense of assumption of
risk are: 1) that plaintiff knows a risk is present, 2) that plaintiff
understands the nature of the risk, and 3) that plaintiff voluntarily chooses
7
to incur the risk.1

10. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1284.
11. Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1982).
12. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1284.
13. In implied assumption of risk, the plaintiff does not expressly agree to assume a
risk of harm but fully understands the risk of harm and voluntarily chooses to subject himself

to the area of risk.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 496C (1965).

14. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1284.
15. O'DonnelI 696 P.2d at 1283; Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977) (originally enacted as Wyo.
STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp. 1973)).
16. In fact, the known and obvious danger rule is part of the definition of the assump-

tion of risk doctrine.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

113 (5th ed. 1979). For example, under the

assumption of risk doctrine, a person may not recover damages for an injury he suffers when
he willingly exposes himself to a known and obvious danger.
17. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 486-487 (5th ed. 1984).
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The assumption of risk doctrine can be divided into two major
categories, express 8 and implied.' 9 Express assumption of risk, which occurs when the plaintiff demonstrates, by contract or otherwise, acceptance
of the risk, 0 is easily understood. For example, express assumption of
risk occurs when a plaintiff stores his automobile in a defendant's garage,
and it is specifically agreed that the defendant is under no duty to pronot be liable for damage
vide heat in the garage. Thus, the defendant will
2'
temperatures.
cold
from
to the car resulting
Implied assumption of risk analysis, with which this casenote is concerned, is more complicated.2 In their treatise on torts, Professors Harper
and James explain that implied asssumption of risk can be analyzed in
one of two ways, which they label as "primary" and "secondary" assumption of risk. 23 Under the primary assumption of risk analysis, the plaintiff's assumption of risk is only the counterpart of the defendant's lack
of duty to protect the plaintiff. In other words, since the defendant has
no duty to protect, the plaintiff has assumed the risk. Under the secondary assumption of risk analysis, the assumption of risk is only a form
of contributory negligence. The key question is whether or not the plaintiff's conduct is reasonable.24 In Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions,
Inc., 25 a New Jersey court recognized and adopted these same categories.

As noted above, implied assumption of risk in its secondary sense is
was
similar to traditional contributory negligence. Comparative negligence
2
designed to alleviate the harshness of contributory negligence. By allowing the trier of fact to weigh the plaintiff's negligence against that of the
defendant's, the comparative negligence doctrine does not totally preclude
a negligent plaintiff's recovery. Because it would be inequitable to apportion fault when the plaintiff has been negligent and to bar recovery completely when the plaintiff has assumed a risk, most jurisdictions either
27
abolished the doctrine of assumption of risk or merged it with comRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
19. See supra note 13.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
21. Id. comment a.
22. As early as 1956, Harper and James criticized the entire doctrine of implied assumption of risk and argued that except in cases of "express assumption of risk," the doctrine
should be abolished. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1162, 1191 (1956). Other
authorities argue that only the category of primary assumption of risk should be abolished.
One commentator has suggested that the concept of primary assumption of risk serves only
to confuse both the court and the jury. Kionka, Implied Assumption of the Risk: Does It
Survive Comparative Fault? 1982 S. ILL. U.L.J. 371, 377-78.
23. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 22 at 1162.
24. Id. It is important to note that under traditional contributory negligence, the plaintiff's recovery has been barred. Under the secondary assumption of risk form of contributory
negligence, the plaintiff's behavior is merged into the mainstream of comparative fault, thus
serving only to reduce the plaintiff's damages, not to bar them altogether. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 17, at 497-98.
25. 54 N.J. Super. 25, 148 A.2d 199 (1959), modified, 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).

18.

26.

HEFT AND HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §

1.20, at 5 (1978).

27. Whether or not a plaintiff will prevail in a comparative negligence jurisdiction
depends on how assumption of risk is interpreted. If a jurisdiction follows the primary assumption of risk analysis, the plaintiff will never prevail since no duty is recognized and no duty
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parative negligence.28 Wyoming is such a jurisdiction. 9 When Wyoming
followed the rule of contributory negligence, it recognized no distinction
between traditional contributory negligence and assumption of risk.30
However, when Wyoming abolished contributory negligence and adopted
comparative negligence, it preserved the assumption of risk doctrine for
the purpose of allocating fault between the plaintiff and the defendant.
In Brittain v. Booth,31 the Wyoming Supreme Court explained that

[t]he comparative negligence statute directs apportionment of fault

occasioned by [the plaintiff's] negligence which is "not as great
as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought."
Since, in Wyoming, assumption of risk has been held to be a form
of contributory negligence, the obvious legislative intent was to
2
include it within the apportionment [of fault].1
Thus, as a form of contributory negligence, assumption of risk is not an
absolute defense in Wyoming. It is merely a basis for the apportionment
of fault by the trier of fact.33 The known and obvious danger rule falls
can be breached. On the other hand, if a jurisdiction follows the secondary assumption of
risk analysis, a plaintiff might prevail after the defendant's breach of duty is weighed against
the plaintiff's contributing behavior.
28. Easterday and Easterday, The IndianaCooperative FaultAct: How Does It Compare With Other Jurisdictions? 17 IND. L. REV. 883, 895 (1984). Comparative negligence
jurisdictions have taken a variety of approaches in applying the assumption of risk doctrine.
A majority of states merged assumption of risk with contributory negligence prior to adopting comparative negligence. H. WooDs, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 6:10,
at 151-152 (1978 & Supp. 1985). A large majority of states have statutorily merged or completely abolished assumption of risk upon adopting comparative negligence. Id § 6:7, at 142.
Other states have merged the doctrine of implied assumption of risk with contributory
negligence after adopting comparative negligence. Id § 6:4, at 129; § 6:8, at 146-147; § 6:9,
at 149. Some jurisdictions still maintain the assumption of risk doctrine even though they
have adopted comparative negligence. Id. § 6:11, at 155. In addition, a very few states still
view assumption of risk as a valid defense despite the advent of comparative negligence.
Id § 6:3, at 128-129; § 6:6, at 140-141. Finally, in the state of Georgia, the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence co-exist. Id. § 6:2, at 122.
29. See Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977) (originally enacted as Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp.
1973)) which provides:
(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence was
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.
Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributed to the person recovering.
(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
(i) If a jury trial, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts;
(ii) If a trial before the court without a jury, make special findings of fact,
determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. The court shall then reduce the amount of such
damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person
recovering;
(iii) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of negligence.
30. Ford Motor Company v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1963).
31. 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979).
32. Id. at 534.
33. Id
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within the parameters of the assumption of risk doctrine. 4 Like the
assumption of risk doctrine, application of the known and obvious danger
rule requires knowledge, understanding and voluntariness on the part of
the plaintiff. It follows, therefore, that like the assumption of risk doctrine, the obvious danger rule should not constitute an absolute defense.
It should, like the assumption of risk doctrine, be considered by the trier
of fact in allocating fault. As will be shown, this has not always been the
case in Wyoming.
WYOMING CASE LAW

It is clear that Wyoming merged assumption of risk and contributory
negligence prior to adopting comparative negligence. But, it is not clear
whether Wyoming uses the primary or secondary assumption of risk
analysis in applying the obvious danger rule. A review of Wyoming case
law reveals that the Wyoming Supreme Court has applied both the
primary assumption of risk analysis and the secondary assumption of risk
analysis on different occasions."
In the past thirty years the Wyoming Supreme Court has on numerous
occasions interpreted the obvious danger rule as primary assumption of
risk.3 6 In February 1983, the Wyoming Supreme Court reiterated the
37
primary assumption of risk rule in the case of Norman v. City of Gillette.
The plaintiff in Norman complained that a barricade on the sidewalk
caused him to walk in the street where he slipped and fell while climbing
over a mound of snow and ice. In denying the plaintiff's claim, the court
applied the no-duty formula of primary assumption of risk, stating:
First there is the rule that no duty exists which requires either
the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of its existence.
Second is the rule that no duty exists to remove the natural accumulation of snow and ice .... 3
Had the court applied secondary assumption of risk, the plaintiff's
negligence would have been weighed against that of the city's. Rather than
basing the verdict against the plaintiff on the lack of defendant's duty
to remove natural, obvious accumulations, the trier of fact would have
analyzed both defendant and plaintiff behavior. Conceivably, the trier of
fact could have reached the same conclusion, but the analysis would have
been from the opposite point of view-looking at the plaintiff's behavior
rather than the defendant's lack of duty.
34. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 277 (1971); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 3D 230, 268 (1971).

35. For a detailed, informative history of the cases illustrating Wyoming's treatment
of the obvious danger rule see Note, Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule,
Primaryor Secondary Assumption of Risk?, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 374, 377-382 (1983).
36. See Norman v. City of Gillette, 658 P.2d 697 (Wyo. 1983); Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1981); Bluejacket
v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1976); LeGrande v. Misner, 490 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1971); Watts
v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718 (Wyo. 1963); Boatman v. Miles, 27 Wyo. 481, 199 P. 933 (1921).
37. 658 P.2d 697 (Wyo. 1983).
38. Id. at 705 (citing Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1982)).
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At the same time, the Wyoming Supreme Court has applied the secondary assumption of risk analysis since at least as early as 1914.11 Although
it did not specifically apply the secondary assumption of risk doctrine in
ContinentalMotors Corp. v. Joly,40 the court in that case relied on McKee
v. PacificPowerand Light Co.41 for the proposition that the obvious danger
rule reflects secondary assumption of risk. In McKee, an experienced electrician was denied compensation for the injuries he suffered when he came
in contact with a high voltage power line. McKee illustrates just how confusing the law on this subject has been since the Wyoming Supreme Court
used both primary and secondary assumption of risk analysis to reach
that holding. On one hand the court said that the no-duty obvious danger
rule negates a defendant's duty, stating that "there is no liability for injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as wellknown to the person injured as they are to the owner of the facilities in
question.' '42 On the other hand, the court stated that the plaintiff's
negligence barred recovery:
Without deciding whether there was substantial evidence of a
breach in the standard of care which defendant owed to plaintiff,
we can say as a matter of law the accident... necessarily resulted
from one of the following: (1) From an unavoidable accident; (2)
from the assumption of a risk as well-known to plaintiff as it was
to defendant; or (3) from the contributory negligence of plaintiff. 43
Indeed, in subsequent decisions, the court has cited McKee as authority
for both primary and secondary assumption of risk analyses. 44 More recently in Brittain v. Booth, the court considered the complaint of a sixteen
year old plaintiff who was injured while working on an excavation for an
underground gasoline tank."5 Acknowledging that the pit was an open and
obvious danger, the court declared, nonetheless, that "assumption of risk,
as a form of contributory negligence is not an absolute defense to a
negligence action, but is a basis for apportionment of fault. '"46
A pattern can be discerned from the way the Wyoming Supreme Court
has applied the two different assumption of risk analyses. In suits against
landowners and government entities for injuries caused by natural ac39. Carney Coal Co. v. Benedict, 21 Wyo. 163, 129 P. 1024 (1913), aff'd on rehearing,
22 Wyo. 362, 140 P. 1013 (1914). See also Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979); Berry
v. Iowa Mid-West Land and Livestock Co., 424 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1967); Loney v. Laramie
Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 255 P. 350 (1927); Chicago and Northwestern Ry. v. Ott, 33 Wyo.
200, 237 P. 238 (1925), reh'g denied, 33 Wyo. 200, 238 P. 287 (1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S.
585 (1926).
40. 483 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1971).
41. 417 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1966).
42. Id. at 427.
43. Id. at 428.
44. In Sherman the court indicated that the McKee formulation of the obvious danger
rule was primary assumption of risk analysis. Sherman, 642 P.2d at 789. In direct contrast,
the Joly court interpreted McKee to reflect secondary assumption of risk analysis. Joly, 483
P.2d at 246.
45. Brittain, 601 P.2d at 536.
46. Id. at 534.
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cumulations of ice and snow, the court has applied the no-duty obvious
danger rule.4" In suits involving the plaintiff's status as a trespasser,
licensee or invitee and in suits involving the master-servant relationship,

48
the court has applied the secondary assumption of risk analysis. The

1921 case of Boatman v. Miles, 49 however, defies this pattern. In Boatman, a servant sued his master for injuries caused by the attack of the
master's vicious stallion. The court applied primary assumption of risk
analysis, stating that a servant's assumption of risk was the equivalent
50
of saying that no duty existed on the part of the master-defendant.
While application of both forms of implied assumption of risk can be
found in Wyoming case law, the most recent decisions employ the primary
assumption of risk doctrine. 5' This apparent trend toward adoption of
primary assumption of risk analysis makes the O'Donnell decision, in
which the court rejects primary assumption of risk analysis in favor of
secondary assumption of risk analysis, even more surprising.
In the 1983 case of Cervelli v. Graves, 52 however, the Wyoming
Supreme Court foreshadowed a departure from the primary assumption
of risk analysis by placing significant limitations on the no-duty obvious
danger rule. In Cervelli, an ice and snow case that did not involve landowner liability, the court, for the first time, limited the application of the
no-duty obvious danger rule to situations in which a landowner is sued
for accidents caused by natural accumulations of snow and ice on his land.
The plaintiff-truck driver in Cervelli brought a cause of action against
a cement truck driver for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge erred in
instructing the jury that the known and obvious danger rule applied to
an automobile collision case where the parties involved were not in control of the premises where the accident occurred. 3
The court held that the known and obvious danger rule was not ap4
plicable to all negligence cases or even to all ice and snow cases.5 The
court said application of the known and obvious danger rule in cases other
than those involving landowners and natural accumulations of ice and
snow abrogated the comparative negligence statute.55 The court, however,
did not explain why application of the no-duty obvious danger rule in landowner and natural accumulation cases did not itself abrogate the statute.
47. See Norman v. City of Gillette, 658 P.2d 697 (Wyo. 1983); Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1981); Bluejacket
v. Carney, 505 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1976).
48. See Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979); Berry v. Iowa Mid-West Land
& Livestock Co., 424 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1967); Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 255
P. 359 (Wyo. 1927); Chicago and Northwestern Ry. v. Ott, 33 Wyo. 200, 237 P. 238 (Wyo.
1925).
49. 27 Wyo. 481, 199 P. 933 (1921).
50. Id at 935.
51. Norman v. City of Gillette, 658 P.2d 697, 699 (Wyo. 1983).
52. 661 P.2d 1032 (Wyo. 1983).
53. Id. at 1039.
54. Id at 1039-40.
55. I& at 1039.
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By holding in O'Donnell that an obvious danger does not negate the
defendant's duty to keep streets and sidewalks in good repair and that
the obviousness of the danger may be considered by the trier of fact to
determine the plaintiff's comparative negligence," the Wyoming Supreme
Court has departed from the primary assumption of risk analysis. The
O'Donnell court expanded the Cervelli rule by holding that the primary
assumption of risk analysis will not be applied in cases other than landowner and natural accumulation situations, even where a defendant has
control over the premises. In effect, the court's perspective of the obvious
danger rule has shifted to accommodate full recognition of comparative
negligence. Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court in O'Donnell makes two
key changes in Wyoming law. First, it overturns the no-duty obvious
danger rule, and second, it adopts the secondary assumption of risk
analysis.
In reaching its decision, the court addressed the City of Casper's argument regarding McKee. The City of Casper cited McKee 57 for the proposition that Wyoming law creates no liability for injuries from obvious, apparent, or well known dangers if such dangers are as well known to the
plaintiff as to the defendant.18 In McKee, the court applied the obvious
danger rule to a situation involving man-made dangers. 59 As the court
decided before the adoption of comparative
noted, however, McKee was
60
negligence in Wyoming.
At the time of the McKee decision, the obvious danger rule was viewed
as negating a duty on the part of the defendant- primary assumption
of risk. Although the court has held that the comparative negligence
statute did not impose any new duty of care on defendants,6 1 the court
declared in O'Donnell that a landowner has a duty to protect against
known and obvious dangers, except in situations involving natural accumulations of snow and ice.6 2 The court, thus, adopted the long held position of Justice Rose 3 by applying the obvious danger rule as a factor for
the trier of fact to consider in apportioning negligence between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The court attempted to reconcile the O'Donnell decision with the rules
in Sherman v. Platte County and other cases-that no duty exists which
requires the removal or warning of an obvious danger and that no duty
exists to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice-by noting that
the rules6 4 were established before the advent of comparative negligence
56. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1284 (Wyo. 1985).
57. 417 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1966).
58. Brief for Appellee at 5-6, O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985).
59. McKee, 417 P.2d at 426.
60. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1281.
61. Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 790 (Wyo. 1982).
62. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1284.
63. Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 540 (Wyo. 1979) (Rose, J. dissenting); Bluejacket
v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 499 (Wyo. 1976) (Rose, J. specially concurring).
64. Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1982).
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in Wyoming. In addition, the court pointed out that although the aforementioned rules were cited in Norman, Sherman, Bluejacket v. Carney,
and Johnson v. Hawkins, those cases were actually decided on the second
rule: that no duty exists to remove the natural accumulation of snow and
ice. 6 5 Finally, and most importantly, the court recognized that a no-duty
recovery is incompatible
obvious danger rule acting as a complete bar to
6
negligence."
comparative
of
with the doctrine
The court drew another distinction between Sherman, the cases cited
therein, and O'Donnell. The court observed that the slip and fall situations in those cases resulted from the natural accumulation of snow and
ice. In O'Donnell, however, the accumulation of gravel was not a product
of natural conditions. Instead, it was the result of road and maintenance
work by the City of Casper.
In his dissenting opinion in O'Donnell, Justice Rooney, joined by
Justice Raper, defined the obvious danger rule in Wyoming 7as being
premised on lack of negligence on the part of the defendant. Justice
Rooney maintained that assumption of risk,6 8on the other hand, is
something resulting from the plaintiff's behavior. Accordingly, if a known
and obvious danger exists, there is no duty to be breached or negated.
Justice Rooney ignored the Wyoming decisions in which the court has
interpreted the obvious danger rule as secondary assumption of riskexamining the plaintiff's conduct-and failed to reconcile the court's prior
inconsistent holdings.6 9 Justice Rooney's contention that the obvious
danger rule is separate from the assumption of risk doctrine directly conthe obvious danger rule is a part of the
flicts with the majority view that
assumption of risk doctrine. 0
As the court noted in O'Donnell, the choice between primary assumption of risk analysis and secondary assumption of risk analysis is of critical
importance. If the rule is viewed as negating a defendant's duty-primary
assumption of risk-the plaintiff will never be allowed to recover. But,
if the rule is viewed as a factor to be considered by the trier of fact, the
plaintiff is not necessarily barred recovery.'
By adopting secondary assumption of risk analysis, Wyoming affords
the plaintiff the opportunity to present his case and to have his negligence
weighed against the defendant's in all but those situations involving landowners and natural accumulations of snow and ice. The O'Donnell decision makes sense in light of the court's rationale to apply the comparative
negligence statute. The only drawback to O'Donnell is that the court did
not go far enough. Rather than definitively adopting secondary assump65. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1282.
66. Id. at 1283.
67. Id. at 1290 (Rooney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 277 (1971); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 3D 230, 268 (1971); HARPER
& JAMES, supra note 23, at 1471.
71. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1281-82.
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tion of risk analysis in all obvious danger cases, the court hedges by
distinguishing between man-made hazards and natural hazards of snow
7
and ice.

2

Implicit in the O'Donnell decision is the realization that comparing
the plaintiff's negligence with the landowner-defendant's negligence will
not result in harsh verdicts against landowners or a flood of lawsuits
brought on by injured plaintiffs as a result of unpredictable Wyoming
weather. Instead, the application of the comparative negligence statute
will merely allow the equitable analysis of plaintiff and defendant behavior.
Because the court in O'Donnell qualified its decision by drawing a
distinction between natural and non-natural hazards, it is unclear whether
the court will apply primary or secondary assumption of risk analysis in
situations involving land possessors and natural accumulations of snow
and ice. Since the court has adopted secondary assumption of risk analysis
in all other cases, it might be anticipated that the obvious danger rule
will no longer serve as an absolute bar to plaintiff recovery in landowner
and natural accumulations of snow and ice cases, either. On the other hand,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has a history of tenaciously protecting landowners from potential liability for natural accumulations of snow and ice.
This history and the distinction made in O'Donnell suggests that the court
will continue to apply the no-duty obvious danger rule to protect landowners in cases involving natural accumulations of snow and ice.
In past decisions, the court has ignored legislative intent to compare
landowner-defendant's fault with the fault of the plaintiff.7 3 By holding
that the no-duty obvious danger rule still applies to cases involving landowners and natural accumulations of snow and ice, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has continued to exclude landowner cases from the purview of the
comparative negligence statute. Yet, the comparative negligence statute
contains no language which suggests that the landowner is exempt from
4
comparative fault.y

In keeping with the legislative purpose of the comparative negligence
statute, past Wyoming case law demonstrates the Wyoming Supreme
Court's intention of eliminating all absolute defenses. For example, the
last clear chance doctrine" was abrogated by the concept of comparative
negligence in the 1979 decision of Danculovich v. Brown.76 Similarly, the

court stated that the comparative negligence statute has abolished "gross
72. Id. at 1282-83.

73. See Norman v. City of Gillette, 658 P.2d 697 (Wyo. 1983); Sherman

v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1981);
Bluejacket
v. Carney, 505 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1976).
74. See Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977) (originally enacted as Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp.

1973)).
75. The last clear chance doctrine fixes liability upon the last wrongdoer. In other words,
if the defendant has the last opportunity to avoid harm, the plaintiff's negligence is
not a

"proximate cause" of the result.
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76. 593 P.2d 187, 195 (Wyo. 1979).
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negligence."" Wyoming appears to be moving towards abolishing absolute
defenses as has Texas, a jurisdiction which has abolished the defenses8
of no duty, assumption of risk, open and obvious, and last clear chance."
Yet, for no good reason, the court still recognizes absolute defenses for
landowners in cases involving natural accumulations of snow and ice.
The court should expand its earlier holdings in light of the comparative
negligence statute and apply the O'Donnell secondary assumption of risk
analysis to future cases regarding landowner liability and natural accumulations of snow and ice. The abolition of the no-duty obvious danger
rule will not hurt landowners nor will it subject them to unjust treatment.
Instead, the court will be giving full credence to the comparative
negligence statute by recognizing that statute's purpose: to eliminate abthe harsh consequences of traditional
solute defenses and to ameliorate
contributory negligence. 9
CONCLUSION

In O'Donnell v. City of Casper, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that its past application of primary assumption of risk analysis was
based on a rule established before the adoption of comparative negligence.80 As such, the court conceded that the rule must be modified. "An
bar to
inflexible rule that a known and obvious danger is an absolute
negligence.' '81
comparative
of
doctrine
the
with
compatible
not
is
recovery
It can be inferred from O'Donnell that with the adoption of comparative
negligence in Wyoming, primary assumption of risk will no longer bar a
negligent plaintiff's recovery. Instead, the court has embraced the doctrine of secondary assumption of risk: the trier of fact will compare the
negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. Futhermore, a known and'
obvious danger no longer negates a duty or the liability of the defendant."
"Gone are the days when a scintilla of negligence by the plaintiff will bar
recovery. "83 Al that remains now is for the Wyoming Supreme Court to
relinquish the last vestige of the no-duty primary assumption of risk
analysis by applying the secondary assumption of risk analysis in all obvious danger cases.
LISA A. YERKOVICH
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58, 61 (Wyo. 1982).
78. Bennett v. Span Industries, Inc., 628 S.W. 2d 470, 473 (Tex. 1982); Sherman v. Platte
County, 642 P.2d 787, 790 (Wyo. 1982).
79. See Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977) (originally enacted as Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp.
1973)); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1979).
80. O'Donnel4 696 P.2d at 1283.

81. Id.
82. 1& at 1284.
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